Introduction
T he study by Avelino et al. (2011) represents an advance in the debate on vote regionalization for Brazilian elections. As acknowledged in the literature, the regional aspect is fundamental for the understanding of the Brazilian political dynamics mainly because of electoral rules for legislative elections: a proportional method with open list in multimember districts (Ames, 1995a (Ames, , 1995b Mainwaring, 1991, among others) .
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However, authors suggest there are deficiencies in the indicators of vote regionalization and suggest a new indicator, the G Index, to measure the vote concentration level for each candidate.
The use of this indicator, however, does not attend to other aspects in the debate, for it does not give information in disaggregated levels of analysis and, thus, does not allow for the identification of the particular areas where the candidates' votes are located.
These are relevant aspects, for one does not expect either homogeneous or random vote distributions across cities: the votes should reflect the candidates' efforts to attract sections of the electorate, be it during the campaign or during their mandates. In addition, in order to observe the formation of "reduto" 1 (Hunter and Power, 2007; Zucco, 2008 
The LQ and HC Indices
As pointed to in Avelino et al. (2011) , the traditional indicators of vote concentration are problematic and need to be replaced. The suggested new indicator, the G Index, intends to fill the gap, evaluating the spatial concentration of the vote for a particular party or candidate across the whole district. Its formula is given by the expression
where P im is the percentage of the vote obtained by the i party in the m municipality and P m is the total percentage of the vote of the municipality m in the state total vote. The difference between the party's share of the vote in a given municipality and that of the municipality's in the state's total detects the relative dispersion of the party's vote. Thus, the G Index is a measure of the gross spatial concentration (in the terms of Ellison and Glaeser, 1994) of the party's vote. As this indicator uses proportions, these can be computed for different aggregation levels. The LQ and HC indices, in their turn, allow for a relative evaluation of the regional dispersion of the votes obtained by a specific candidate. (Avelino et al., 2011) .
But the identification of the places of interest for each candidate may be determined, if we control for the number of voters in each municipality.
In order to overcome this difficulty, we first suggest the utilization of the Location Quotient (LQ), as utilized by Bendavid-Val (1991) . Briefly, the LQ may be defined as a measure comparing the proportion of jobs in an activity sector in a regional level to that that would be expected due to the participation of that region in the total work force in the larger area of analysis, be it state or nation. This index shows the relative importance of each region in the sector of the economy under scrutiny, determining if there are work places above what would be expected for that city's size. Thus, an adaptation for electoral results is
where V im is the total of votes cast for candidate i in the municipality
For the computation of the concentration in each municipality, 2 LQ is a simple measure, for it allows for direct inference of the vote proportion cast for the candidate in each municipality above what would be expected if its spatial distribution was homogeneously distributed relative to the number of voters and to the total votes cast for the candidate. The numerator measures the proportion of votes cast for the candidate in a given municipality, and the denominator, the proportion of votes of the city in the district total. Thus, when LQ equals 1, it means that the candidate obtained exactly the number of votes expected in that municipality if the vote distribution was homogeneous, bpsr
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given the total vote cast for the candidate; if it equals 2, the candidate had obtained twice as much as was to be expected, and so on. That information allows for the comparison of the vote obtained per municipality in a homogeneous distribution.
From the LQ, Figleton et al. (2005) propose an adaptation to treat the information on concentration, keeping the original unit with a new index, the Horizontal Cluster (HC).
Assume that is the amount of votes that would equal the LQ observed for a candidate in a given municipality to 1. The HC would be equal to HC VV V LQ Avelino et al. (2011) present cases of representatives whose concentration indices where large in given elections, suggesting vote concentration. We computed the respective LQs and HCs for some cases and drew maps from the results. For the LQ maps, the intervals were created in terms of the standard deviation of the data for the most recent election disputed by the candidate, and were kept constant for previous elections. As to HC, we used the same intervals in all maps, in order to make them comparable for the unit is the same (number of votes). All municipalities where the candidate fared a value smaller than zero -less votes than were to be expected under the homogeneous distribution hypothesis -and a LQ of less than 1 were classified as "negative performance". Other categories inform how many votes the candidate got above those expected under the homogeneous distribution hypothesis. The HC maps show the outline of the administrative sectors to allow for the identification of regions of relative "advantage" of the candidates. The following analysis extends the applications of these indicators. 
Application to Selected Cases
II. Marcelo Fortes Barbieri
Marcelo Barbieri's votes are situated especially in the Araraquara region, in the State's central region. Along the three elections he disputed, his votes concentrate in this area. 
III. Francisco Marcelo Ortiz
In another region of the State, Guaratinguetá, in the state's northeast, is pointed to by Avelino et al. (2011) as having a concentrated vote that becomes decentralized. 
IV. Telma de Souza
Finally, Telma de Souza repeats the previous cases relative to concentration, with an exception: her vote is concentrated from the first to the second election and loses bpsr Glauco Peres da Silva and Andreza Davidian concentration from then on. 
Last Remarks
The indicators presented, LQ and HC, are capable of showing the areas of vote concentration, controlling for the size of the population and the representative's total vote. In this sense, they are complementary to the G Index presented by Avelino et al. (2011) .
It is worth emphasizing that the variations in all the indices considered, Municipal G, LQ and HC will not always be in the same direction throughout all cities. The joint movement of G and LQ may happen when there is a city relatively larger with regard to the others where the representative has gotten many votes, as happened in the case of Antonio Pannunzio in Sorocaba. On the other hand, the indicators reveal the spatial dynamics across the territory, allowing for analyses to be constructed from these results.
Finally, it must be mentioned that, in spite of the data that point to the areas where representatives get their votes, there is not a necessary association with the construction of electoral dominance areas. In the cases here presented, it is a well known fact that Iara
Bernardi gets a concentrated vote in the Sorocaba region, as does Pannunzio; that Angela 
